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Realty Shelter Partnerships in a Nutshell
Donald
I.

J.

Weidner*

Introduction

There continues to be heated discussion about tax reform in
In the past few years, the
feel to be substantively unsupportable moves against the use of real estate
partnerships to deliver tax shelter to high bracket investors. The
purpose of this Article is to explain the Service's actions against
realty partnerships in the context of current manipulations of
the partnership form.
the area of real estate tax shelters.
Internal Revenue Service has taken

II.

The Essence
A.

The term "tax
The

shelter"

what many

op Tax Shelter

In General
is

usually used in one of

two ways.

1

a tax shelter is an investment through
which one pays tax on less cash than one receives. In this sense,
a tax-exempt bond is considered a tax shelter because no tax need
be paid on its interest income. In an investment in depreciable
real estate, a tax shelter in this sense exists in any year in which
the depreciation deduction claimed exceeds the amount of cash
spent to retire the principal on the outstanding indebtedness.
first definition of
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This article was originally presented at a Continuing Legal Education
Program on Real Estate Transactions held by Cleveland State University College of Law on April 18-19, 1975. The author wishes to express his appreciation
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'The focus of this Article is on investments in partnerships holding
depreciable interests in real estate. For a broader discussion of tax shelters
and the need to match investor characteristics with those of a particular
shelter, see Calkins & Updegraft, Tax Shelters, 26 Tax Law. 493 (1973).
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Stated differently, taxable income will be less than the net amount
of cash actually received whenever the deduction for the non-cash
expense of depreciation exceeds the amount of money actually
spent to amortize the indebtedness, a cash expense for which there
2
is no corresponding deduction. Thus, no matter what the other in-

come and expense items in connection with a property, if depreand debt amortization is $80, taxable income will
be $20 less than cash received. If there is an overall cash loss, the

ciation is $100

tax loss will be $20 greater than the cash loss.
Investment advisors who specialize in partnership syndications, however, are likely to respond that their clients who seek
"tax shelter" are using the term in a more narrow sense. Highbracket investors seek surplus losses that can be used to offset
their income from other sources, not merely a stream of income
sheltered from tax as in the case of a municipal bond. Cash flow,
indeed, may be of little or no immediate interest. An investment
in real estate is a tax shelter in this sense whenever the depreciation deduction is greater than the sum of net cash flow plus the
amount of principal paid on indebtedness when, after all the net
cash flow and non-deductible expenditures for debt amortization
are "sheltered" from tax, there will be surplus losses.
Real estate tax shelters would not be as popular as they are
if an investor were permitted to deduct losses only up to the
amount of his actual cash investment in an enterprise. Under the
Internal Revenue Code, however, the amount of borrowed funds
used to acquire a depreciable asset is included in the asset's depreciable cost, or basis, even if the borrower incurs no personal
liability on the indebtedness and the only security for repayment
Stated differently, inis a mortgage of the property acquired.
vestors may treat the entire cost of a depreciable asset as a depreciable investment by them, even if the asset is acquired entirely
with borrowed funds, and even if the asset-acquisition loans are
fully non-recourse. The effect of this rule is that investors may
claim depreciation and other deductions far in excess of the
amount of their actual cash investment.

—

B.

Partnerships in Particular

Realty shelters in the more narrow sense are ineffective unless the individual members of the organization holding the de2
This analysis can be further refined. The essential point is that there
a gap between actual cash expenditures for which there is no current
deduction and fictional deductions that are available without actual cash
expenditures. Thus, it would be more precise to say that there will be tax
shelter in the first sense whenever the fictional depreciation deduction for a
non-cash expense exceeds the sum of the non-deductible expenses for debt
amortization and capital improvement.

is
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surplus losses. Partnerships are

and income

taxed
to the individual partners with no taxation at the partnership
level.
Surplus partnership losses, unlike corporate losses, are
"passed through" to the individual partners for their use in offsetting income from other sources. However, certain elections
are made at the partnership level that bind all the partners, such
as the choice of method of computing depreciation. In sum, the
partnership computes and reports its various items of income,
gain, loss, deduction, and credit, and the individual partners report their allocable shares.
A partner may not deduct his share of partnership losses
below his basis in his partnership interest. 3 A partner's initial
basis in his partnership interest is the amount of money he contributes to the partnership, plus the adjusted basis of any property he contributes. 4 However, the Code specifically provides that
a partner shall be treated as having contributed additional money
to the partnership to the extent he shares in partnership liabili5
ties. Under the Treasury Regulations, general partners in a general
partnership are automatically allocated a share of partnership liabilities in the same proportion as they share in partnership losses.
The Regulations further specify that in the case of a limited partnership, the limited partners may share in partnership liabilities
for basis purposes, but are only deemed to share in those liabilities that are fully non-recourse as to the partners and to the partnership. 6 Such non-recourse liabilities are automatically shared
by the limited partners in the same proportion they share in
7
profits.
The effect is that limited partners may deduct partnership losses far in excess of their cash and property investment in
the partnership, provided they share in non-recourse liabilities
for basis purposes. Because it is critical to an effective limited
partnership tax shelter that liabilities be non-recourse, the partnership agreement should be drafted as a counseling document
tax-reporting, but not tax-paying, entities,

is

3

Losses that are currently non-deductible for lack of basis are not permanently lost; in effect, they are placed in a suspense account and become
deductible in later years to the extent of subsequent increases in the partner's
adjusted basis for his partnership interest. Internal Revenue Code of 1954,
§ 704(d) [hereinafter cited as Code].
4
5

Code
Code

§ 722.

752(a) provides:
increase in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any increase in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of
the assumption by such partner of partnership liabilities, shall be
considered as a contribution of money by such partner to the part§

Any

nership.
6

Treas. Reg. §1.752-1 (e)

7

Id.

(1956).
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that will clearly alert the client that both initial and subsequent
financing must be non-recourse.

What many

investors fail to realize

is

that there is a corollary

treatment of liabilities in later years that can result in unanticipated tax liability. Under the Code, a partner is treated as having received a distribution of cash to the extent his share in
partnership liabilities is decreased, 8 even though those liabilities
are non-recourse. Just as a limited partner automatically receives a share of non-recourse liabilities upon receipt of an interest in profits, he is automatically relieved of his share of partnership liabilities when he parts with his profits interest. Thus,
a limited partner who sells or abandons his partnership interest
will be charged with a constructive distribution of cash to the
extent he is relieved of his share of non-recourse liabilities. 9 The
constructive distribution of cash does not retroactively destroy
the tax shelter benefits. The partnership losses reported by the
limited partner before his withdrawal presumably were used to
offset his ordinary income from other sources, whereas the gain
on the constructive distribution of cash is capital gain. 10 Even if
the recapture provisions require that part or all of what would
otherwise be capital gain be treated as ordinary income, the withdrawing partner will have received, in effect, an interest free
loan from the Treasury, in the amount of deferred taxes, for the
period of deferral. In addition, the losses may have been timed
and claimed in years of greatest income from other sources to
maximize their benefit under the graduated tax rates. 11 Finally,
the withdrawal and resulting constructive distribution may be
timed in a year in which offsetting losses are available.
a

CODE

752(b) provides:
decrease in a partner's share of the liabilities of a partnership, or any decrease in a partner's individual liabilities by reason of
the assumption by the partnership of such individual liabilities, shall
be considered as a distribution of money to the partner by the part§

Any

nership.
9

Rev. Rul. 74-40, 1974-1 Cum. Bull. 159:
Situation 3. Instead of selling his interest L withdraws from the
partnership at a time when the adjusted basis of his interest in the
partnership is zero and his proportionate share of partnership liabilities, all of which consist of liabilities on which neither he, the
other partners nor the partnership have assumed any personal liability, is $15,000.

Accordingly, L is considered to have received a distribution of
the partnership of $15,000 and realizes a gain of $15,000
determined under the provisions of section 731(a) of the Code.
10
This is true except insofar as Code § 751 applies.
11
The partnership interest may have been acquired at the end of the
partner's taxable year to obtain a retroactive allocation of preadmission
partnership losses. See Section VIII infra.

money from
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report ordinary loss deductions far beyond

ability to

actual economic investment by treating acquisition liabilities as

part of depreciable basis is, therefore, central to real estate tax
shelters. The Service has lost major challenges to tax shelters in
cases that have involved two closely related critical factors: the
claim to a depreciable interest by a taxpayer who does not appear
to bear the economic burden of depreciation, and the inclusion in
depreciable basis of liabilities that appear to exist in form but not
in economic reality. 12 Two stunning cases indicate the difficulty
in separating and treating these issues and the consequent continued availability of tax shelter not only in excess of, but independent of, actual economic investment.
In Manuel D. Mayerson™ the taxpayer "purchased" what had
been an unprofitable office building by making a minimal down
payment and giving for the overwhelming bulk of the purchase
price a note the terms of which merit consideration. First, although
"interest" payments were to be made monthly, no repayment of
principal was required until the expiration of ninety-nine years.
Second, the note provided that it was non-recourse as to principal. Thus, the seller could not hold Mayerson personally liable for
his promise to pay the principal amount of the note, but was confined to seeking satisfaction out of the property mortgaged as
security which in this case included no property other than that
allegedly sold. Third, however, the note was with recourse as to
the monthly interest payments as they accrued, but for no more,
not even for accelerated interest payments on default. Finally,
the note provided for substantial discounts if it were paid within
three years from the initial closing date. In fact, five years after
the closing, Mayerson retired the note with a payment of only
sixty percent of its face amount.
The Service's position was "essentially that the purchasemoney mortgage
was a nullity and that a capital investment
in the subject property had not occurred."' 4 In economic reality
and for tax purposes, the Service claimed, the arrangements were
nothing other than a lease with an option to purchase. Because

—

.

.

.

,2

See David F. Bolger, 59 T.C. 760 (1973).
In this connection, we note that the position of the lessor is
sometimes also discussed in terms of his not having any basis. What
is more, such discussion sometimes confuses the two questions, i.e.,
existence of a depreciable interest and the measure of basis, of which
respondent's briefs herein furnished an excellent example.
Id. at 769, n.8.
,3

47 T.C. 340 (1966).

yA

Id. at 349.
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the note was with recourse only as to interest payments already
accrued, Mayerson could walk away from the property at any time
with no more personal liability than had he been a tenant-at-will.
Moreover, since the note was a standing note which required no
amortization payments, Mayerson had no equity buildup from re-

payment of principal to defend or subject to risk of loss.
The Tax Court held for Mayerson, even though it accepted
that "depreciation is not predicated upon ownership of property
but rather upon an investment in property" and that "the benefit
of the depreciation deduction should inure to those

who

suffer

caused by wear and exhaustion of the business
property."' The court did not make clear how the initial sale put
Mayerson in the position of one who would "suffer an economic
loss" by immediate actual depreciation of the structure, but stressed
that both parties intended a sale, not a lease, and that Mayerson
expended substantial sums on repairs and improvements in the
years immediately following the closing. Mayerson's "investment"
in the property included the "valid debt obligation" created by the
purchase-money note. The court said that in light of the frequency
of non-recourse financing of real estate, and in light of the Supreme Court's decision in Crane v. Commissioner,™ the lack of
personal liability would not prevent the note obligation from being
included in basis. 17 Nor would the fact that no principal was required to be repaid for ninety-nine years change the result. Although the ninety-nine year term did "seem unusually long," mortgagees frequently "waive payments of principal on income-producing properties in distress or incentive situations." 18 Moreover, the
court sustained depreciation deductions that had been claimed on
the full face amount of the note, despite the note's provisions for
substantial discounts on early repayment and despite the fact that
the note had been retired at a discount of over a third of its face
amount. The subsequently "negotiated" purchase price was treated

an economic

loss

5

,5

ta

at 350.
331 U.S. 1 (1947). Crane established that relief from liabilities, including non-recourse liabilities, is treated as a distribution of cash in the
context of a system that includes those liabilities in depreciable basis.
16

17

Taxpayers who are not personally liable for encumbrances on property should be allowed depreciation deductions affording competitive
equality with taxpayers who are personally liable for encumbrances
or taxpayers who own unencumbered property. The effect of such a
policy is to give the taxpayer an advance credit for the amount of the
mortgage. This appears to be reasonable since it can be assumed
that a capital investment in the amount of the mortgage will eventually occur despite the absence of personal liability.
47 T.C. at 352.
'«/<*. at 346.
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The court concluded that

"the cost basis at the time of purchase should be the nondiscount
price."

19

David F. Bolger 70 involved "a

fairly typically structured tax

was sustained over the objecThe Service challenged ten different transactions arranged by Bolger in the same basic pat22
tern.
First, a financing corporation would be formed with an
initial capitalization of $1,000, the shareholders of which were the
investors who would ultimately receive title to the property and
claim deductions as owners of depreciable interests. The corporation would then purchase a building that a commercial concern
was prepared to lease immediately. On occasion, the seller of the
building would become the lessee. Then, typically on the same day
as the building purchase, the corporation would sell its own negotiable interest-bearing notes for the full amount of the purchase
shelter of industrial real estate" that

tion of four dissenting judges. 21

price to an institutional lender pursuant to a note purchase agreement that secured the notes by a first mortgage and by an assign-

term of which was equal to or greater than
the maturity of the note. 23 The corporation would then transfer

ment

of the lease, the

the property to

its

investor-shareholders subject to both the long-

term lease and the financing on which none of the investors assumed any personal liability. 24
The commercial tenants occupied the premises under "net"
leases with fixed annual rent. 25 However, the rental payments were
only slightly more than the amount required to pay the debt service due on the mortgage. Under the provisions of the mortgage
and lease assignment, the lessees were obligated to pay the rent
directly to the mortgagee, who would distribute any excess over
}9

Id. at 354.

20

59 T.C. 760 (1973). An excellent discussion of this case is Lurie, Bolger* s
Building: The Tax Shelter That Wore No Clothes, 28 Tax L. Rev. 355 (1973).
2

'Weinstein, The Bolger Case Is a

Real Estate

Warning

to

Tax-Shelter Investors, 2

L.J. 595 (1973).

"Neither the Service nor the taxpayer sought separate treatment for
the individual transactions.
33

The financing corporation was also obligated to pay all the lender's
out-of-pocket expenses, including legal fees.
24

The documentation included an "assumption agreement" under which the
transferee-investors were required to assume all the obligations of the corporation under the lease and mortgage. The agreement provided, however, that
the transferees incurred no personal liability by reason of the assumption. In
short, they "assumed" nothing.

"The leases provided that the lessees would pay all operating expenses,
including taxes, insurance, and repairs. Thus, the rent paid to the lessor was
"net" to him.

INDIANA
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debt service to the corporation. 26 Finally, the lessee's rental obligation was to continue even if the building were destroyed, but in
that event the lessee had the further right to purchase the building
for an amount approximately equal to the sum required to repay
the mortgage financing. 27
In short, the "lessees" looked more like the mortgagor-owners
of the property than did Bolger and his fellow transferees, although the latter claimed the interest and depreciation deductions
as mortgagor-owners. The assignments of the leases to the lenders
obligated the tenants to pay directly to the lenders the full amount
of debt service on the purchase money loans, whereas the investors
had no personal liability on those obligations. The personal liability
of the commercial and manufacturing lessees was critical to the
lender's security for repayment, and the liability of those claiming
depreciation was nonexistent. Because the rents were fixed, the
lessee retained all the benefits of increases in the operating income
of the property. On the other hand, the investors were to receive
only whatever nominal amounts were left over after the lessees'
fixed rent payments were paid to and applied by the lender. The
economic benefit the investors would receive would be in the
buildup of equity in the property which would come under their
control (a) at the expiration of the primary lease, which was
typically twenty-five to twenty-eight years or (b) at the expiration of the renewal options exercisable by the lessee, which were
;

typically for three to five successive five-year

terms at reduced

come into
rent. In short, control of the properties was
the hands of the investors for some time, although there was a
possibility of sharing in refinancing proceeds.
The Service, however, did not argue that the lessees were the
not likely to

ones entitled to the depreciation deductions. Rather, it argued
that the depreciable interest vested in the corporation and did not
pass to Bolger and the other transferees. The argument for denying Bolger the benefit of the deductions was that

because of the long-term leases and the commitments of
the rentals to the payment of the mortgages by virtue
of the assignments of the leases which were consummated
prior to the execution of deeds, the conveyances by each
26
The corporation was required to remain
from engaging in any other activity.

27

in existence

and to refrain

Refusal to accept the offer of purchase would terminate the lease. The
was permitted to sublease the premises or any portion thereof, and he
was permitted to assign his interest in the lease, provided that the sublessee
or assignee promised to comply with the terms of the mortgage and the
lease, and further provided that the lessee remain personally liable for the
performance of all its obligations under the lease.
lessee

1975]
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corporation transferred only a reversionary interest in
the buildings and that consequently petitioner did not
acquire a present interest in the properties which may
28
be depreciated for income tax purposes.
The Tax Court accordingly defined the two basic issues as (1)
whether the corporation or its stockholder-transferee-investors

should be treated as entitled to a depreciable interest and (2)
whether, if the transferees were the holders of a depreciable interest, their bases in that interest included the amount of financing. The Tax Court found that the depreciable interest was held
by Bolger and his fellow investors and concluded that, under the
interpretation of Crane enunciated in Mayerson, the investors
could include the amount of liabilities in their depreciable bases.
IV.

The Limited Partnership

In part because of its defeats in challenges to the underlying
transaction in cases like Mayerson and Bolger, the Service has

launched a series of attacks against the vehicle most commonly
used to deliver surplus losses to high-bracket investors: the partnership and, in particular, the limited partnership. There is a
greater likelihood that the Service will be more successful in such
litigation because partnership tax doctrine is relatively undeveloped and was not designed to deal with current realty shelters.
Subchapter K was drafted with the "ma-and-pa" grocery store
more in mind than anything resembling publicly syndicated partnerships, offered and sold with computer printouts of depreciation and amortization schedules demonstrating post-tax return on
investment to participants in different income brackets. The Regulations provide little additional guidance, and judicial development
of some of the major provisions of Subchapter K has just begun.
Given that the Service is relatively unfettered by established partnership doctrine, the limited partnership in particular stands ripe
for attack for the very reason that it is so much more popular than
the general partnership it offers investors a pass-through of
losses while providing a freedom from personal liability that appears extremely corporate.
The "corporateness" of the limited partnership form becomes
even more clear from an historical perspective. Limited partner-

—

ship acts in this country 29 antedated general corporation acts by
28

59 T.C. at 768 (footnote omitted).
Limited partnerships, which were also originally referred to in this
country as "special partnerships," were not an American invention:
In the French law, partnerships are distinguished into three sorts.
* * * (2.) Partnerships in commandite, or in commendam, that is,
limited partnerships, where the contract is between one or more
29

INDIANA
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At a time

cult to obtain, creditors
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which corporate charters were

who wanted more than a

diffi-

fixed rate of

more "interest" than usury laws
permit,
were
subject to the risk of judicial imposition of
would
personal liability as "partners" based on profit sharing. The solution was found in the early limited partnerships acts, which prointerest on their investment, or

if one were really an outside creditor, and if that
were made clear to the world at large, he could share in profits
free from personal liability. Thus, a passive investor who followed
the statutory procedure for informing the world of the nature
and extent of his limited interest would be free from the personal
liability of a partner. The early acts were strictly construed by the
courts, which imposed full liability for minor failures in compliance. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act now provides that
personal liability will not be imposed because of technical deviations from statutory requirements 3 and continues the themes of
passive investment and formal notice to the world. 32

vided in short, that

fact

'

Formation and Notice

A.

to the

World

Unlike a general partnership, a limited partnership will not
spring into existence as a matter of law. Under the Act a limited
partnership "is formed if there has been substantial compliance in
good faith" with the Act's filing requirements. 33 Section 2 requires that a certificate of limited partnership be filed containing

who are general partners, and jointly and severally responand one or more other persons, who merely furnish a particular
fund or capital stock, and thence are called commandataire, or commendataires, or partners in commandite; the business being carried
on under the social name, or firm of the general partners only,
composed of the names of the general or complementary partners, the
partner in commandite being liable to losses only to the extent of the
funds or capital furnished by them. * * * Similar distinctions are
adopted in many other foreign countries, and in the Laws of Louisiana. Special partnerships in commandite have also been recently
persons,
sible,

introduced into the jurisprudence of several States in the Union.
But the regulations applicable to such partnerships vary in different
countries and States, and are strictly local, and therefore seem unnecessary to be brought further under examination in the present

Commentaries.
J.

Story, Commentaries

on the Law op Partnership

127-28 (6th ed. 1868)

(citations omitted).
30
3

See generally A. Bromberg, Partnership §26, at 143-44 (1968).

'Uniform Limited Partnership Act

32
33

ULPA
ULPA

§§ 10,

6.

§2(2).

§ 11

[hereinafter cited as

ULPA].
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34

In essence, the certificate must
identify the general and limited partners and detail the nature
and extent of the interests of the limited partners and the extent
to which new limited partners may be admitted. Thus, for example, the certificate must state how much, when, and under
what circumstances the limited partners must contribute, the share
of profits or other compensation by way of income that each limcertain specified information.

ited

partner will receive by

way

of his contribution,

and any

limit-

ed partner's right to demand property other than cash in return
for his contribution. A major inconvenience of the limited partnership form is that the certificate must be amended to reflect changes
in the required information. The partnership agreement should be
drafted to remind the client that improper or misleading notice to

the world, either as a result of omissions or false statements in
the certificate, 35 or by improper use of the surname of a limited
partner in the partnership name, 36 can result in the loss of limited
liability.

B.

A

The Limited Partner as Passive Investor

limited partner

may

contribute cash or other property, but

not services, for his interest in the partnership. 37 Although limited
partners "as such shall not be bound by obligations of the partner33

a limited partner may lose his limited liability if he takes
part in the "control" of the business. 39 A disadvantage of the limited partnership form is uncertainty about what constitutes "control" within the meaning of the Act. The statute does not say that
a limited partner who exercises control will automatically lose his
limited liability. It simply provides that he may lose it. In short,
the wording of the Act does not require strict application of the
"control" provision, and courts may take into account considerations of third party reliance in determining whether to deny limited liability to a limited partner who has arguably exercised conship,"

trol.

40

34

Under the ULPA as enacted in some jurisdictions, a certificate must be
more than one place. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 34-10(1) (b)

filed in

(Supp. 1975); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 88.030(1) (b)

ULPA § 6.
36
ULPA § 5.
37
ULPA § 4.
38
ULPA §1 (emphasis

(1973).

35

39

added).

"A

limited partner shall not become liable as a general partner unless,
in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a limited partner, he

takes part in the control of the business."
A0

ULPA

§ 7

(emphasis added).

See Feld, The ''Control" Test for Limited Partnerships, 82 Harv. L. Rev.
1471 (1969).
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peculiar nature of limited partnerships under local law
continues to present questions under the Code, which has no sep-

The

arate limited partnership classification. In Meyer v. Commission4
it was recently held that an exchange of a general partnership
er,
interest for a limited partnership interest was not an exchange
'

of like-kind properties, even though both partnerships
rented apartments in the same area:

owned and

A

general partner has a broad spectrum of rights and
liabilities while a limited partner is largely shielded from
liability and his rights are generally limited to a right to
inspect the partnership books, to an accounting, to have

the partnership dissolved in certain situations and, under
certain circumstances, to withdraw his contribution to
the partnership. ... He may not actively participate in
running the business and his liability is generally limited
42
to the amount of his investment.
In conclusion, insofar as limited partnerships were originally created to avoid the common law of partnership liability when the
corporate form was not readily available, insofar as the nature of
a limited partner's rights and liabilities is "of a different nature

and character" from those of a general partner, and insofar as the
principal advantage of the limited partnership form after the
enactment of general corporation acts lies in its treatment as a
partnership for tax purposes, it is not surprising that the Service
has suggested that certain limited partnerships be classified as
corporations for tax purposes.

Federal Income Tax Classification

V.

A.

Two

Unreliability of the Regulations

points should be emphasized at the outset of a discussion

of the classification Regulations. First, under the Regulations,

an

organization may be taxed as a corporation even if it is a partnership under local law. Federal law determines the standards for
tax classification, while local law determines whether the federal
standards are met. 43 Second, the Regulations cannot currently

be viewed as completely controlling with respect to tax classification. An organization may qualify as a partnership under the Regulations and still have no assurance that it will be so classified for
tax purposes. The Service would prefer to withhold partnership
4,

42
43

503 F.2d 556 (9th Cir.), aff'g per curiam 58 T.C. 311
503 F.2d at 557-58 (citations omitted).

Treas Reg.

§

301.7701-1 (c)

(1965).

(1974).
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from limited partnerships that appear extremely
corporate and is attempting to work around the present classification Regulations, which are heavily biased toward partnership
classification

classification of all partnerships, general or limited,

under Uni-

44

The Regulations, originally based on the opinion in
45
Morrissey v. Commissioner, were amended in an attempt by the
Treasury to make it extremely difficult for professional associations to achieve corporate classification. The battle with the profesform

Acts.

sional associations is over, but the Service is saddled with Regula-

tions extremely biased

toward partnership

classification.

46

A

brief

review of the Regulations will reveal the bias and highlight the
significance of the Service's recent actions.
B.

The Code

definition of a "partnership" is a negative one, 47

embracing groups that are
44

A

few

The Regulations

states authorize a

not, for tax purposes, trusts, estates,

form of organization known as a "partner-

ship association" or a "limited partnership association."

Prior to the adop-

tion of the current classification Regulations, the Regulations provided that

such organizations were taxable as corporations. Treas. Reg. § 39.3797-6
(1955). The current Regulations treat partnership associations in the section
captioned "Partnerships" and do not flatly state that they are taxable as
corporations, but merely provide that they, like other organizations, must
run the "corporate characteristics" gamut to determine their classification.
Treas Reg. § 301.7701-3 (c) (1960). In Rev. Rul. 71-434, 1971-2 Cum. Bull.
430, the Service applied the "corporate characteristics" test to an organization
formed as a partnership association under Ohio law and concluded that the
organization was taxable as a corporation.
4S
296 U.S. 344 (1935). In Morrissey, the Court found a "trust" to be
association taxable as a corporation.

46

Clarity on the corporate-noncorporate characterization has not
been promoted by the curious but economically understandable role
reversal which has occurred. In the 1920-30s the tax authorities were
seeking corporate treatment of many unincorporated organizations
which resisted it. In the 1950-60s the tax authorities were resisting
corporate treatment of many unincorporated organizations which
sought it. In each period, of course, it was a matter of which form
produced higher taxes for the organizations involved.

A. Bromberg, Partnership §24, at 140 (1968).
47

The term "partnership" includes a syndicate, group, pool, joint
venture, or other unincorporated organization, through or by means
of which any business, financial operation, or venture is carried on,
and which is not, within the meaning of this title, a trust or estate or
a corporation; and the term "partner" includes a member in such a
syndicate, group, pool, joint venture, or organization.
Code

§

7701(a) (2)

(emphasis added). See also Code

§

761(a), (b).

an
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48
Under the Regulations, "corporate characterisor corporations.
tics" are the basis for distinguishing a partnership from an as-

Six "major characteristics"
ordinarily found "in a pure corporation" tend to distinguish the
corporate form from other organization forms. These corporate
characteristics include (1) associates; (2) an objective to carry on
business and divide the gains therefrom; (3) coninuity of life; (4)
centralization of management; (5) liability for corporate debts
limited to corporate property; and (6) free transferability of interests. Because the first two characteristics are "generally common to both corporations and partnerships," tax classification
depends on the presence of the last four. 49 Furthermore, the Regulations provide that an unincorporated organization will "not be
classified as an association unless such organization has more
corporate characteristics than noncorporate characteristics." 50
The basic rule is that partnership classification is available whenever any two of the last four corporate characteristics are avoided.
Although the Regulations state that "other factors" in addition
to these "may be found in some cases which may be significant in
classifying an organization as an association, a partnership, or
a trust," there is no suggestion as to what those "other factors"
sociation taxable as a corporation.

might

be.

51

1.

Centralization of

Management

Centralized management is present if any person or group
"has continuing exclusive authority to make the management decisions necessary to the conduct of the business" such that the
persons "resemble the directors of a statutory corporation." 52
Those having the authority need not be members of the organiza53
tion,
but must have
48

"Corporation" is broadly defined to include "associations, joint-stock
companies and insurance companies." Code § 7701(a) (3). See also Treas.
Reg. § 301.7701- (c) (1965), which provides:
The term "corporation" is not limited to the artificial entity
usually know as a corporation, but includes also an association, a trust
classed as an association because of its nature or its activities, a jointstock company, and an insurance company.
49

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (a) (2)

50

Id.

§301.7701-2 (a) (3).
5}
Id. §301.7701-2 (a)(1).
s
Hd. § 301.7701-2 (c) (1).
zations "composed of

(1965).

The Regulations further provide that organigenerally are centrally managed.

many members"

52

Id. §301.7701-2 (c)(2):
Centralized management can be accomplished by election to office,
by proxy appointment, or by any other means which has the effect
of concentrating in a management group continuing exclusive author-

ity to

make management

decisions.
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continuing exclusive authority to make independent business decisions on behalf of the organization which do
not require ratification by members of such organization.
Thus, there is not centralized management when the centralized authority is merely to perform ministerial acts
54
as an agent at the direction of a principal.
Exclusivity of management authority is flatly deemed absent in
general partnerships because of the "mutual agency relationship"
among general partners. An agreement among the partners to
vest

management powers

exclusively in a select

an outsider who had no notice of
constitute centralized management.

fective as against

sufficient to

few

Even though

"will be inefit"

and

is in-

may

not exercise "control"
over the business, limited partnerships generally do not have
centralized

limited partners

management. However, "centralized management

ordi-

narily does exist in such a limited partnership if substantially all

the interests in the partnership are owned by the limited part55
ners."
It is not clear what "interests" are significant, for example, in net cash flow, capital, or taxable income or loss. Nor
is there any indication in the Regulations when "substantially all"
the interests are owned by the limited partners, although there
appears to be some informal understanding that centralized management is eliminated when the general partners own at least
twenty percent of all the interests in the partnership.'56
2.

Limited

Limited Liability

present "if under local law there is no
member who is personally liable for the debts of or claims against
the organization." 57 Personal liability exists with respect to each
general partner in a general partnership. Similarly, personal
liability exists with respect to each general partner in a limited
partnership except
liability is

with respect to a general partner when he has no substantial assets (other than his interest in the partnership)
which could be reached by a creditor of the organization
54

Id. §301.7701-2 (c)(3)

(emphasis added).

S5

Id.

§301.7701-2 (c)(4)

(emphasis added).

"Sexton, Qualifying as a Partnership for Tax Purposes, 1974-2 N.Y.U.
32d Inst, on Fed. Tax. 1447, 1459.
57

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (d) (1) (1965). Even if a person who is personally liable for the obligations of the organization is the beneficiary of

an indemnification agreement, personal liability still exists with respect to that
member if the member remains personally liable to creditors. Id. This is true
whether or not the indemnifying party is a member of the organization.

.
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and when he is merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of
the limited partners. 58
The general partner must have no substantial assets and also must
be merely a "dummy" before the corporate characteristic of
limited liability will be present. Limited liability may not even be
deemed to exist with respect to a corporate general partner with

insubstantial assets. Personal liability exists with respect to a

corporate general partner
when the corporation has substantial assets (other than
its interest in the partnership) which could be reached
by a creditor of the limited partnership. ... In addition,
although the general partner has no substantial assets
(other than his interest in the partnership), personal
liability exists with respect to such general partner when
he is not merely a "dummy" acting as the agent of the
59
limited partners.
It would seem impossible for a limited partnership to have the
corporate characteristic of limited liability because there will be
personal liability as to general partners who are not "dummies,"
whether they have substantial assets or not if they are "dummies,"
personal liability will exist with respect to the limited partners
60
for whom they act.
;

S.

Free Transferability of Interests

if each of the members of the organization "or those members owning substantially
all of the interests in the organization have the power, without the
consent of other members, to substitute for themselves in the same
organization a person who is not a member of the organization." 61

Free transferability of interests

55
59

Id.

§301.7701-2 (d)(2)

Id.

As

to

what

is

present

(emphasis added)

constitutes "substantial assets," the Regulations state:

[I]f the organization is engaged in financial transactions which involve large sums of money, and if the general partners have substantial assets (other than their interests in the partnership), there exists
personal liability although the assets of such general partners would
be insufficient to satisfy any substantial portion of the obligations of
the organization.
Id.
60

Notwithstanding the formation of the organization as a limited partwhen the limited partners act as the principals of such general partner, personal liability will exist with respect to such limited

nership,

partners.
Id.
61

7d. §301.7701-2 (e)(2). If the right to substitute is subject to a right
of first refusal in the other members,
it will be recognized that a modified form of free transferability of
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The member must be

able to transfer, without consent, "all the
attributes of his interest in the organization." 62 Free transfer-

not exist when a member can assign his right to
share in profits "but cannot so assign his right to participate in
the management of the organization." 63 Furthermore, even though
the agreement provides for the transfer of a member's interest,
ability does

no power of substitution and no free transferability of
law a transfer of a member's interest results
in the dissolution of the old organization and the formation of a
"there

is

interest if under local

organization." 64

new

The corporate

characteristic of free transferability can be
eliminated in a wide variety of situations at little or no cost. Because of the "control" limitation, limited partners generally have

very

little

right to participate in

management and are generally

only entitled to an accounting and the right to inspect and copy
the partnership books. Therefore, little, if anything, is lost to
the transferee who does not become the full substitute of a limited
partner. Further, restrictions on transfer may be necessary for
reasons apart from the classification Regulations for example,
to assure continued availability of a private placement or intrastate
exemption to the state or federal security laws, and to avoid automatic termination for tax purposes.

—

Continuity of Life

4-.

An

organization has continuity of life "if the death, insanity,
bankruptcy, retirement, resignation, or expulsion of any member
will not cause a dissolution of the organization." 45 Dissolution is
defined as "an alteration of the identity of an organization by
reason of a change in the relationship between its members as
determined under local law." 66 Thus, dissolution is defined as a
mere technical reconstitution of the organization under local law
so that, theoretically, a new organization continues the business.
Termination of the business is not required to eliminate continuity
an organization,
the presence of this modified corporate characteristic will be accorded
less significance than if such characteristic were present in an unmodified form.
Id. How much "less significance" will be accorded is not clear.
interests exists. In determining the classification of

62

Id. § 301.7701-2 (e)

63

Id.

(1).

Under the ULPA, a limited partner may not assign

all his interest
unless given a right to do so in the certificate or unless all the members consent.
§ 19. Therefore, he may assign only his interest in profits and

ULPA

and not his interest

losses
64
65

in

management.

Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (e) (1)

§301.7701-2(b)(l).
66
Id. §301.7701-2 (b)(2).
Id.

(1965).
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may be

eliminated even though the business may
be continued indefinitely. 67 Even contractual obligations to continue the organization by the remaining members upon the death
or withdrawal of any member will not result in continuity of life
if, notwithstanding such agreement, the organization is dissolved
under local law. Furthermore, notwithstanding an agreement to
continue the organization for a stated period or until the completion of a stated transaction, if any member has the power under
local law to dissolve the organization, continuity of life is eliminated. Therefore, partnerships corresponding to either of the
Uniform Acts lack continuity of life. 68
of

life,

67

which

This

is so

even though

ULPA

§ 20 provides:

The retirement, death or insanity of a general partner dissolves the
partnership, unless the business is continued by the remaining general
partners

Under a right so to do stated in the certificate, or
With the consent of all members.
66
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 (b) (3) (1965). The Service took the position
that the California Limited Partnership Act, Cal. Corp. Code §§ 15,501 et seq.
(West 1955), as amended in 1963, id. §15,520 (West Cum. Supp. 1975), no
(a)

(b)

longer corresponded to the ULPA, such that a California limited partnership
necessarily had the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. Such a
conclusion is critical to public limited partnerships, which normally have the
corporate characteristics of centralization of management and free transferability of interests, and which will be taxed as corporations if they are deemed
to have either of the two remaining corporate characteristics limited liability
and continuity of life. The thrust of the California amendments was to
further a policy of investor democracy by mandating the right of limited partners to vote on certain matters affecting the basic structure of the limited partnership, such as the sale of all or substantially all the partnership assets and
the election or removal of general partners. As a result of the uncertainty
caused by the Service's position, the California legislature, effective November 1, 1973, re-amended the California Act so that the continuity of life
provision is again identical with the ULPA provision. Id. § 15,520.5.

—

Notwithstanding the amendment to the California statute, the California
Commissioner of Corporations has stated that he will continue to require
provisions in the limited partnership agreement authorizing a vote of the
limited partners to remove a general partner and accept a new general
partner.

With the 1973 amendment to the California Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the withdrawal of the general partner who is voted out
will cause the dissolution of the organization, and there is no provision
in the statute providing for continuity in that case. Thus, under the
existing Regulations, continuity of life will not exist in a California
limited partnership even if there is a provision in the partnership
agreement for continuing the partnership where a general partner
is voted out and a new general partner is voted in.
Sexton, supra note 56, at 1468.

On June 11, 1974, the Service ruled that the amended California
Limited Partnership Act, which provides for dissolution of a partnership
upon the retirement, death or insanity of a general partner, is a statute cor-
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Revenue Procedure 72-13 and Beyond

In short, the Regulations are so biased in favor of partnership classification that draftsmen developed quick rules of thumb
to eliminate at least two corporate characteristics to secure partnership classification. Into this rather pleasant world for limited partnerships, the Service dropped the bombshell of Revenue
Procedure 72-1 3. 69 This procedure purports to do nothing
more than state the conditions that must be met to obtain an
advance ruling on the tax classification of a limited partnership
whose sole general partner is a corporation. 70 Nevertheless, many
practitioners have been compelled to treat the requirements of 72-13
as substantive and binding, not merely procedural. First, as a
practical matter, some transactions would not be consummated
without an advance ruling. Second, agents began to apply the 72-13
71
quidelines as substantive requirements on audit. Third, some state
securities agencies have begun to insist that the requirements of
72-13 be met on the ground that an offering is not sufficiently
"fair, just and equitable" if the critical element of a partnership
tax classification is unestablished. Finally, many practitioners
are painfully aware that a limited partnership with a sole corporate
general partner is functionally indistinguishable from a corporation apart from tax considerations. The basic objection to the
72-13 requirements is not that partnership classification is ultimately appropriate, but that the requirements are inconsistent
with the Regulations and somewhat arbitrary. The three requirements are those of stock ownership, investment unit, and net

worth.
1.

Stock Ownership

The requirement that the

"limited partners will not own,

more than
the corporate general partner or any

directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate,

20 percent of the stock of
72
affiliates"
is arguably relevant to the corporate characteristic

responding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. Thus, an association
formed under the California Act as amended would lack the corporate characteristic of continuity of life. Rev. Rul. 74-320, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 404-05.
The ruling emphasizes that the Regulations require only a very technical kind
of dissolution to eliminate continuity of

life.

69

Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 735.
70
The requirements of Revenue Procedure 72-13 are applied in any situation in which a limited partnership has no individual general partner.
71
Welter, Limited Partnerships With A Corporate General Partner Rev.
Proc. 72-13, 5 Tax Advisor 329 (1972).
72
Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 735. For the purpose of determining
stock ownership in the corporate general partner or its affiliates, the attribution rules of Code § 318 apply.

—
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73
If the limited partners own enough stock in
of the Regulations.
the corporate general partner to control it, centralized management

analogous to that placed in a corporate board of directors may be
present. Continuity of life may be present if the limited partners
can prevent the corporate general partner from dissolving or withdrawing from the partnership. Free transferability of interests is
arguably present if the limited partners can force the general
partner to approve transfers of interests. An attempt at limited
liability is present if the corporate general partner is merely an
agent controlled by the limited partners. 74 Consider the most
clear-cut example of a corporate general partner wholly owned
by the limited partners in proportion to their partnership interests. Avoidance of corporate tax and entitlement to pass-through of
losses would be sought, in effect, by the device of dubbing the
stockholders limited partners.

In part because the stock ownership requirement is fairly
arguably related to the corporate characteristics in the classification Regulations, criticism has centered not so much on the fact
that a stock ownership requirement is imposed as on the twenty
percent figure. Some feel that the twenty percent limit on ownership of the stock of the general partner is too strict because the
holders of only twenty percent of the stock of a corporation rarely
control it, even though effective control is often present in the
absence of absolute control.
2.

Investment Unit

The requirement that the purchase

of a limited partnership
a mandatory or discretionary purchase
or option to purchase any type of security of the corporate general partner or its affiliates" is somewhat more elusive. The
interest "does not entail

rationale appears to be that such a coupling

the Service to determine exactly what
73

is

makes

it

difficult for

being purchased. The prin-

This requirement seems to assume a corporate general partner with only
one class of stock.
74
However, it is hard to imagine when there could be limited liability under
the Regulations since they state there would be personal liability as to the
limited partners who "control" a general partner. See text accompanying
notes 37-40 supra. There is, however, one basic possibility that suggests itself.
Under the Regulations, the personal liability of the limited partners in such
a situation is based on local law. If, under local law, a reliance requirement
were imposed before limited partners would lose their limited liability because
of "control," then there might not always be personal liability resulting
from an exercise of control. Consider, for example, the situation in which a
limited partnership's asset is subject to a long-term net lease to a management
company. The ability of the limited partners to control the relatively minor
functions that might be undertaken by the general partner might be insufficient to support an imposition of personal liability on them.
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on the lack of its correlation with the twenty percent stock ownership limitation, insofar as the coupling of any purchase of any security of the corporate
general partner with the purchase of a limited partnership interest is sufficient to preclude a favorable ruling. In any event,
the investment unit requirement is not that controversial because
the problem generally is easy to avoid.
cipal criticism of this requirement centers

Net Worth

3.

The net worth requirement has caused the greatest controversy

:

If the corporate general partner has an interest in
only one limited partnership and the total contributions
to that partnership are less than $2,500,000 the net worth
of the corporate general partner at all times will be at
least 15 percent of such total contributions or $250,000,
whichever is the lesser if the total contributions to that
partnership are $2,500,000 or more, the net worth of the
corporate general partner at all times will be at least 10
percent of such total contributions. 75
Although objections have been made that these requirements are
77
inherently vague 76 and arbitrary,
the fundamental objection is
that they are in direct conflict with the Regulations.
;

75

Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 735.

76

The vagueness objection focuses on the uncertainty in computing the
two central figures to the net worth requirement total contributions to the
partnership and the net worth of the corporate general partner. Revenue
Procedure 72-13 does not elaborate on the computation of "total contri-

—

butions" to the limited partnership. The Service apparently will exclude
from the scope of the term "contributions" the value of services rendered or
to be rendered by a general partner and loans made to the partnership.
Weiler, Limited Partnerships with Corporate General Partners: Beyond Rev.
Proc. 72-18, 36 J. Taxation 306 (1972). As to the question of loans, debtequity distinctions, although developed primarily in the corporate context,
apply also to partnerships. Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.C. 90 (1964). If
a "loan" were treated as a contribution to capital for basis purposes, it would
presumably be similarly treated in computing "total contributions" under
Revenue Procedure 72-13. See generally Rev. Rul. 72-135, 1972-1 Cum. Bull.
200; Rev. Rul. 72-350, 1972-2 Cum. Bull. 394. It is also unclear whether the
general partner must, from the outset, maintain its net worth in relation to the
total contributions as they are made or to the total expected contributions. The
contributions of the limited partners in real estate partnerships are frequently
made on a staggered basis, like construction loans. It is not clear whether the
general partner can satisfy Revenue Procedure 72-13 by maintaining the required percentage of contributions at any given point and increasing its net
worth as contributions increase.
77

When the corporate general partner has an interest in only one limited
partnership, the partner's net worth does not include its interest in the

:
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The net worth requirements bear directly on the corporate
The Regulations state that when

characteristic of limited liability.

the general partner personal liability exists as
it has substantial assets other than its interest in the partnership. However, the Regulations further provide that the corporate characteristic of limited liability will not
be present, even if the general partner has insubstantial assets, so
long as the general partner is not merely a "dummy" acting as
agent for the other partners. 78 The net worth requirement of
72-13 effectively eliminates the latter provision in the Regulations,
at least insofar as it is being applied as a substantive requirement
by agents on audit and state securities commissioners. To that
extent, 72-13 does more than increase the difficulty of avoiding
the corporate characteristic of limited liability. It is tantamount
to a requirement that the corporate characteristic of limited liability must be in eliminated, and, as such, it is not in accord with
the equal weight given each characteristic under the Regulations.
More recent actions by the Service have converted the uncertainty caused by Revenue Procedure 72-13 into fear of an all-out

a corporation

is

to the corporation if

any accounts or notes receivable from or payable to
the limited partnership. If the corporate general partner has interests in more
than one limited partnership, Revenue Procedure 72-13 seems to require that
limited partnership or

net worth be computed without reference to any of its interests in any limany accounts or notes receivable from or payable to
any limited partnership
If the corporate general partner has interests in more than one
limited partnership, the net worth requirements explained in the preceding paragraph will be applied separately for each limited partnership, and the corporate general partner will have at all times (exclusive of any interest in any limited partnership and notes and accounts receivable from and payable to any limited partnership in
which the corporate general partner has any interest), a net worth
for each
at least as great as the sum of the amounts required
separate limited partnership.

its

ited partnership or to

.

.

.

Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 Cum. Bull. 735. This latter rule has been criticized
as an arbitrary exclusion of valuable assets of the general partner, particularly
insofar as it eliminates from the computation assets in the form of limited
partnership interests in limited partnerships in which the corporation is not
a general partner.

Revenue Procedure 72-13 also requires that a corporation, when it is the
partner of more than one limited partnership, must maintain
at all times a net worth as great as the sum of the amounts required with
sole general

respect to each limited partnership. This rule has been criticized as encouraging the formation of a single, large, limited partnership in order to bring
the ten percent figure into operation, since several small limited partnerships

would each be required

when
78

to

meet the fifteen percent requirement which applies
than $2,500,000.

total contributions are less

See the discussion of the corporate characteristic of limited

in text

accompanying notes 57-60 supra.

liability
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war on realty shelter partnerships. In Revenue Procedure 74-17,
,,
the Service announced "certain conditions under which it would
not issue advance rulings "concerning classification of organizations which raise factual questions as to whether their 'principal
79
Revenue Procedure
purpose* is the reduction of Federal taxes."
74-17 contains a direct disclaimer of a kind not included in Revenue
Procedure 72-13:
These operating rules do not define, as a matter of law,
whether the principal purpose of the organization is the
reduction of Federal taxes, nor whether participants in
an organization are partners or whether such an organization is a partnership, nor do they define any other
terms used in the Internal Revenue Code, Income Tax
Regulations, Procedure and Administration Regulations,
or Revenue Rulings. 60
Nevertheless, the requirements clearly set out the kinds of factors
that Commissioner Alexander had mentioned as susceptible to
challenge. 81
.01

The

interests of all of the general partners, taken

together, in each material item of partnership income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit is equal to at least one

percent of each such item at all times during the existence
of the partnership. In determining the general partners'
interests in such items, limited partnership interests
owned by the general partners shall not be taken into
account.
.02

The aggregate deductions

to be claimed by the

partners as their distributive shares of partnership losses
for the first two years of operation of the limited partnership will not exceed the amount of equity capital invested
in the limited partnership.
.03 A creditor who makes a nonrecourse loan to the
limited partnership must not have or acquire, at any time
as a result of making the loan, any direct or indirect interest in the profits, capital, or property of the limited
partnership other than as a secured creditor. 62
In short, the Service has identified several characteristics of
realty partnerships that may subject them to challenge under
partnership doctrine and under more general principles of tax
avoidance. Paragraph .01 is aimed at allocation systems, of the type
discussed below, that produce dramatic separations of economic
"Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 Cum. Bull. 438.
60

/d. at 439.

61

5ee 40

82

J. Taxation 37 (1974).
Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CUM. Bull. 438, 439.
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benefits from tax benefits and raise questions about the existence
of a partnership and about the "principal purpose" of partnership allocations. Paragraph .02 is a suggestion that a resultoriented approach may be applied to the "principal purpose"

and can also be interpreted
as raising fundamental issues about whether a partnership has
been entered into for "profit." Paragraph .03 suggests that nonrecourse "loans" made to the partnership by participants will be
scrutinized more carefully to determine whether they may be
limitation on partnership allocations

used to increase basis or to support claims of guaranteed payments.

Early this year, the Service issued Revenue Procedure 75-16,
a "checklist outlining required information that is frequently
omitted from requests for rulings" on tax classification. 83 The
information now required to obtain a classification ruling includes
many items that, until recently, practitioners had not considered
relevant to the issue of tax classification. The required informa-

worth representations as to

general partners,
not merely corporate general partners, a detailed description of
"creditors* interests" and "benefits," and a detailed description
of the partnership's method of allocating profits and losses, including the economic significance, if any, of negative capital accounts. In effect, those seeking classification rulings must now
disclose factors that will alert the Service to potential challenges
to some or all of the partnership's characteristics and transactions
on issues other than classification. In addition, it has recently
been reported that the Service has taken the position on audit
that the non-recourse nature of a major portion of a limited
partnership's liabilities, coupled with a lack of substantial assets
on the part of its corporate general partner, will cause a limited
partnership to have the corporate characteristic of limited lia64
bility.
The net effect of these recent actions is that counsel must
be much more cautious about relying on "the letter of the law"
as it has been written until recently and more concerned about
the economic realities of proposed partnership arrangements.
tion includes net

VI.

all

Partnership Allocations

various economic and tax consequences of operations among partners has long been considered a
prime advantage of the partnership form. Section 704 broadly
states that a partner's share of income, gain, loss, deduction, or
credit may be determined by the partnership agreement, except
that allocations that are made for the "principal purpose" of
Flexibility

63
&A

in

allocating

Rev. Proc. 75-16, 1975 Int. Rev. Bull. No. 10, at 59.
Point to Remember No. 1, 28 Tax Law. 409 (1975).

:
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the avoidance or evasion of tax shall be disregarded and reallocated according to the partner's ratio for sharing "taxable in-

come or

loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)
Thus, for example, a partner who undertakes to pay all
partnership research and experimental expenditures may be allocated the deductions for the full amount of those expenditures,
provided the allocation is not made for the principal purpose of
tax avoidance or evasion. 86

(9)." 85

In the real estate area, a great deal of advantage has been
taken of the ability to allocate items of deduction and loss, and the
Service has recently refused to rule on whether the "principal purpose" limitation has been violated. 87 Partners, particularly in
real estate partnerships, rarely have one, flat, over-all percentage
interest. A partner may have several ratios for sharing different
items of partnership income, gain, loss, deduction, or credit, and
the ratios may change over time. The benefit of depreciation deductions, for example, is frequently allocated specially. Many real
estate partnerships use three basic allocations to separately allocate cash benefits and surplus losses: (1) net cash flow;
(2) taxable income or loss; and (3) proceeds in the event of
refinancing or sale. These three allocations operate concurrently,
not alternatively.

The following hypothetical demonstrates the use

way

allocation system to allocate to limited partners

of a three-

a greater

share in tax losses than they have in cash benefits. A limited
partnership is formed with general partner G and limited partners
A and B. The partnership agreement provides that the net cash
flow from the enterprise will be allocated 50% to G and 25% each
to A and B. The partnership agreement also provides that the
proceeds of any refinancing or sale will be allocated 60% to G
and 20% each to A and B. The partnership agreement further
provides that the taxable income or loss of the partnership will

among

the partners in proportion to their initial conG makes no initial contribution to capital
and A and B each make an initial contribution to capital of $5,000.
An apartment house is acquired for $100,000, paid for with

be allocated

tributions to capital.

the initial contributions to capital and the proceeds of a $90,000

non-recourse loan.

The partnership thus has three
all

different allocation ratios,

or none of which could be brought into play in a particular year,

depending on the results of partnership operations
65

66

Code

§

704(b).

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2), Example (5) (1964).
67
Rev. Proc. 74-22, 1974-2 Cum. Bull. 476.
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Net
Cash Flow

Proceeds of
Refinancing
or Sale

Taxable
Income
or Loss

50%
25%
25%

60%
20%
20%

0%

G

A
B

50%
50%

Consider the effect of such an allocation system in a typical year
in which there is a tax shelter in our second sense and in which
88
there is no refinancing or sale of the property.
If rent receipts
are $10,000, real estate taxes are $700, maintenance expenses are
$300, debt amortization is $2,000, and interest paid on indebtedness is $6,000, the net cash flow from the operation of the property is $1,000. If the depreciation deduction in the same year is
$12,000, the partnership has a $9,000 tax loss for the year computed as follows

TI
TI
TI

— NCF — Depreciation
= 1,000 — 12,000 + 2,000
= (9,000).

-f-

Debt Amortization

Under the hypothetical partnership agreement, the net cash
flow will be allocated according to the 50-25-25 ratio specified in
the partnership agreement and the tax loss will be reported by
the partners according to the 0-50-50 ratio of their initial contributions to capital. In summary, as a result of the year's operation, the partners are allocated the following:

Net Cash Flow

Shares of Partnership
Tax Losses

G

$500

$

A

250
250

Shares of

B

loss

deduction

4,500 loss deduction
4,500 loss deduction

attractiveness of this kind of arrangement to a promoter who
wants to pass the bulk of tax losses to his investor-partners is

The

clear.

By

allocating tax losses according to initial capital con-

G

has established a fixed ratio that passes to the
limited partners the benefit of all depreciation and other deductions
beyond those necessary to shelter from tax the net cash flow and
debt amortization of the partnership. In an apparent desire to
conceal the extreme separation of tax and economic consequences
that three-way systems can effect, they are frequently drafted in
ways that are extremely difficult for the uninitiated to decipher.
For example, the "taxable income or loss" and "net cash flow"
allocations may be carefully defined but never so labeled.

tributions,

88

See section

II

supra.
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has never been decided whether allocations of "taxable
income or loss" are subject to the "principal purpose" limitation
of Code section 704(b) (2), and the Committee on Partnerships of
It

Tax Section recommended last sumbe amended specifically to make alloca-

the American Bar Association's

mer that Subchapter

K

tions of "taxable income or loss" subject to the principal purpose
69
This suggestion would not necessarily accomplish
limitation.

because

anything,

is

it

not

limitation would be applied.

clear

One

how

the

basic problem

purpose

principal

that standards
for the application of the principal purpose limitation have never
been developed. The only decision that disregarded an allocation
on the basis of section 704(b) (2) is Stanley C. Orrisch, 90 which
is

involved such a clear-cut violation of section 704(b) that it offers
little insight into the scope of the principal purpose limitation.
Orrisch involved two husband and wife couples, the Orrisches and

who had been equal partners in the ownership of
two apartment houses. In a year in which the Crisafis had substantial tax losses from other sources, they changed their agreement and allocated the Orrisches all the depreciation deductions
of the partnership. The Orrisches' capital account was lowered
by the amount of all the depreciation deductions allocated to
them, with the result that their account was far below that
of the Crisafis. The court found that the charges against the
The
Orrisches' capital account had no economic significance.
the Crisafis,

shift in the allocation of depreciation deductions,

although re-

had

flected as a charge against the Orrisches' capital account,

no effect on any of the non-tax arrangements of the parties, not
even on the division of the proceeds from the sale of the partnership property. The basic test for determining whether the principal purpose of an allocation is for the avoidance or evasion
of tax is whether it has "substantial economic effect and is not
merely a device for reducing the taxes of certain partners with." 91
out actually affecting their shares of partnership income
.

.

.

the depreciation deductions to the
Since the allocation
Orrisches did not "actually affect the dollar amount of the partners' shares of the total partnership income or loss independently
of

of tax consequences,"

92

it

ing to "taxable income or
89

ABA

nerships,

all

was disregarded and
loss,

reallocated accord-

as described in section 702(a) (9),"

Committee on Partnerships, Report of the Committee on Part-

Tax Section Recommendation No. 197 A-5, 27 Tax Law.

839, 847

(1974).
90

55 T.C. 395 (1970), affd per curiam

Am. Fed. Tax R.2d

fl

73-556, at 73-1069)

91

S.

92

Treas. Reg. § 1.704-1 (b) (2)

P-H 1973 Fed. Taxes

fl

(9th Cir., Mar. 30, 1973).

Rep. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 379 (1954).
(1964).

28, 566 (31
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according to the parties' 50-50 ratio for sharing the general profits or losses.
Allocations of "taxable income or loss" are often difficult
Care has
to attack under the principal purpose limitation.
usually been taken to relate the allocation of taxable income or
loss to some economic aspect of the partnership, such as initial
contribution to capital. Furthermore, it is difficult to determine
how an allocation of taxable income or loss in a partnership agreement should be reallocated in the event it is disregarded. Section
704(b) provides that if an allocation does not pass muster under
the principal purpose limitation, it will be disregarded and reallocated according to the partners' ratio for sharing "taxable
income or loss of the partnership, as described in section 702(a)
(9)." This presented no difficulty in Orrisch because the parties
had one, flat, 50-50 ratio for sharing everything but depreciation
deductions. However, consider the conundrum presented an eager
tax collector who would like to disregard an allocation of "taxable income or loss" and is faced with the rule that disregarded
allocations are to be reallocated in accordance with "taxable income or loss." The answer, in short, to the difficulty in applying
this reallocation mechanism is that "taxable income or loss, as
described in section 702(a) (9)" was intended to be the partners'
ratio for sharing the overall profits and losses of the enterprise.
Therefore, if it is decided that the partners' allocation of taxable
income or loss should be disregarded because it controls tax losses
and nothing more and is for the principal purpose of avoidance
or evasion of tax, the losses should be reallocated according to the
ratios that control the partners' shares in the economic consequences of the enterprise. Note that this could be the ratio
for sharing net cash flow, the ratio for sharing proceeds of refinancing or sale, or a combination of both. For safety's sake,
allocations of taxable income or loss should be given some economic
significance other than their relation to initial contribution to
capital. The Orrisch court rejected the petitioners' argument that
they could be specially allocated all the depreciation because they
had contributed more money to the partnership than their partners
and would continue to do so. Therefore, a special allocation of tax
benefits should conservatively be correlated with some economic
component of what the partners take out of a partnership, not
simply with what they put in.
The above hypothetical represents an extreme situation in
which the general partners as a group have no interest in the
operating profits or losses of the partnership. During 1973 the
Service began to focus on what it considered to be a problem in
the tax classification of a limited partnership in which the general
that

is,
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has a zero interest in the profits or losses of

partners have a minimal interest. There
that a person

who

the partnership

is

&27

not a partner.

is

Several cases have considered

the presence or absence of an interest in the profits of a partnership an important indicator of the status of a taxpayer as a
partner.

93

Even

if

the general partner remains liable for partner-

it is hard to distinguish him from a
he does not share in profits. A decision
that a "general partner" is not a partner because he has no in-

ship obligations under state law,

third-party guarantor

terest in profits

may

if

not result in classifying the organization as

Under

law there appear to be two basic possibilities: (1) a limited partnership is nonetheless formed because
there has been "substantial compliance in good faith" with the
Act's filing requirements; or (2) the "limited partners" have failed
to create a limited partnership and have created a general partnership. Under the first possibility, limited liability, which Revenue
Procedure 72-13 indicates is so critical, is present.

an

association.

The

local

Service's concern about this issue

sented in Revenue Procedure 74-17, in which

was
it

officially

refused to rule on

tax classification unless the combined interest of

all

partners in each item of partnership income, gain,

loss,

or credit

is

pre-

the general
deduction,

at least one percent of each item throughout the life of

the partnership. 94 This would directly affect the hypothetical just
discussed but is not that significant because, with one exception,

by careful drafting. The
exception is that state securities agencies may require that a priority on cash return be given to the investor-partners. The result
is that there may be years in which all the cash flow goes to
the limited partners and none to the general partners. Presumably,
the imposition of such a priority will not preclude an advance ruling, especially if cash flow is not considered an item of "income,
gain, loss, deduction or credit" within the meaning of Revenue
it is

easy to comply with at

little

cost

Procedure 74-17. 95
93

See,

e.g.,

Paul

J.

Kelly, 29

Podell, 55 T.C. 429 (1970)

;

S.

&

CCH Tax

Ct.

M. Plumbing

94

Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CUM. BULL. 438.

95

For further discussion

Mem. 1090

Co., 55 T.C.

of special allocations

(1970)

;

Hyman

702 (1971).

and the "principal pur-

pose" limitation, see Kaster, Real Estate Limited Partnerships Special Tax

on Fed. Tax. 1799; McGuire, When
Will a Special Allocation Among Partners Be Recognized?, 37 J. TAXATION 74

Allocations, 1973-2 N.Y.U. 31st Inst,

(1972); Weidner, Passing Depreciation to Investor-Partners, 25 S.C.L. Rev.

215 (1973).
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Compensating the Promoter-Partner
A.

A

LAW REVIEW

Guaranteed Payments

major reaction to the

on the deductibility of
prepaid interest has taken place in the area of compensation of
promoter-partners. The Code provides that payments to a partner
restrictions

96

for services or for the use of his capital constitute "guaranteed
payments" that are deductible by the partnership as if they were
made to an outsider, provided they are "determined without re-

gard to the income of the partnership." 97 In an attempt to maximize loss deductions, realty partnerships are documented to characterize as much as possible of the cash distributed to promoterpartners as deductible guaranteed payments for their services or
98
Because the recipient of the guaranfor the use of their capital.
teed payment must report it as ordinary income, intensified use
of the guaranteed payment provision to generate partnership deductions could initially be viewed as an inoffensive trade-off with
little loss

to the Treasury.

The reason the practice

is

offensive

from a revenue-raising point of view is that the "guaranteed payments" are commonly made to promoter-partners who have substantial losses from other sources, and shelter-seeking investors
are allocated the bulk of the partnership deduction. In effect, the
guaranteed payment provision enables investors to assign their
income to promoters who can absorb taxable income because of
surplus losses from other sources.
The surprisingly prevalent practice of immediately deducting
alleged guaranteed payments that would clearly be required to
be capitalized if made to an outsider was recently laid to rest in
Jackson E. Cagle, Jr." In 1968 a promoter and two investors formed a partnership to deal in commercial property. By separate agreement the partnership agreed to pay the promoter-partner a management fee of $110,000, of which $90,000 was to be paid on or
9(

>See Rev. Rul. 68-643, 1968-2
T.C. 556 (1975).

Cum. Bull.

76;

G. Douglas Burck, 63

97

To the extent determined without regard to the income of the
partnership, payments to a partner for services or for the use of
capital shall be considered as made to one who is not a member of the
partnership, but only for the purpose of section 61(a) (relating to
gross income) and section 162(a) (relating to trade or business
expenses)
Code

§ 707(c)

9e

(emphasis added).

Less attractive options include having the promoters receive compensation in ways not deductible by the partnership, such as the sale of an asset
to the partnership at a profit or the receipt of a more substantial share of
net cash flow or proceeds of refinancing or sale.
"63 T.C. 86 (1974).
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before December 31, 1968. The partnership claimed a deduction
for the expenditure and distributed the resulting losses to the
investor-partners. The court rejected the contention that payments
falling within the definition of section 707(c) are automatically
deductible and held that such payments must "run the gauntlet
00
The court looked
of section 162(a) in order to be deductible."'
to the nature of the services performed and held that the expenditures were so related to the construction of a capital asset that
they had to be capitalized.

Even more

significant than the Cagle conclusion that capital

expenditures cannot be made currently deductible by the use of
section 707(c), a holding anticipated by most tax practitioners,
yox
is the very recent decision in Edward T. Prattf
in which the court
disallowed claims for guaranteed payments for services on the
ground that they were based on "income." The taxpayers in Pratt
were the cash-basis general partners of two accrual-basis limited
partnerships, each formed for the purchase, development, and operation of a shopping center. Each limited partnership agreement
obligated the general partners to expend their "best effort" to the
management of the partnership. In return, the general partners as

a class were to receive "a fee of five (5%) per cent of the initial
and then .
ten (10%) per cent
Gross Base Lease Rentals
of all overrides and/or percentage rentals." The taxpayers agreed
to divide the fees equally, the managerial services were performed,
and the management fees were equally credited to accounts payable to them. The fees, which were reasonable in amount, were
accrued and deducted annually by each partnership but were not
paid to or reported by the taxpayers in the three years in question.' 02
.

.

.

.

.

The Tax Court held that the management fees did not qualify
were based on "income."' 03

as guaranteed payments because they
,00

/d. at 94.

101

64 T.C. No. 17,

1(189, at 2583

(May

8,

CCH Tax

Ct. Rptr.

Current Regular Dec. No.

1974).

102

The amount of management fees accrued by each of the partnerships in each of the years indicated is a reasonable and proper fee to

managing a shopping center of the type of
A like amount of fees would have had
to be paid to a third party, not a general partner, as a fee for managing the shopping centers had such shopping centers been managed

pay for the

services of

Parker Plaza and Stephenville.

by a third party.
Id. at 2585.
103

The amounts

of the management fees are based on a fixed percentage of the partnership's gross rentals which in turn constitute
partnership income. To us it follows that the payments are not de-

33,
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form of a share of gross

rentals is

based on "income" will come as a shock to many who have interpreted the "determined without regard to the income of the partnership" language of section 707(c) to mean determined without
regard to the availability of net income. Because the payments
were based on gross income, the partnership, and hence the other
partners, could be bound to pay the fees if other expenses exhausted
partnership receipts. The court specifically found that all the partners intended the fees to be fully paid, and that the taxpayers could
legally have caused the two partnerships to pay them. Unlike
the charges to capital accounts in Orrisch, the credits to accounts
payable in Pratt had economic significance. Therefore, the taxpayers presumably could have withheld current distributions to
the limited partners until they had been paid and, if net receipts
were insufficient, could have satisfied their claims out of the proceeds of refinancing or sale. Pratt would be less of a surprise if
there were any indication in the opinion that the underlying leases
were net leases. In that event, the fees would have been based on
and payable out of surplus cash and would have looked less "guaranteed" by the partnership and more like an attempt to transform
distributive shares of partnership income into deductible form.
The Pratt court rejected the argument that the management
fees were deductible by virtue of the section 707 (a) provision that
a transaction between a partner and his partnership "other than
in his capacity as a member of such partnership" shall "be considered as occurring between the partnership and one who is not
a partner." Without deciding "whether a continuing payment to
a partner for services was ever contemplated as being within the
provisions of section 707(a)," the court concluded that section
707(a) would in no event apply to the instant case, because the
taxpayers
were to receive the management fees for performing
services within the normal scope of their duties as general partners and pursuant to the partnership agreement.
There is no indication that any one of the petitioners
was engaged in a transaction with the partnership other
than in his capacity as a partner. 104
This rationale has tremendous potential impact because section
707(c) can be interpreted as a qualification of section 707(a) that
is fully subject to the "other than in his capacity as a member of
termined without regard to the income of the partnership as required
by section 707(c) for a payment to a partner for services to be a
"guaranteed payment."
Id. at 2588.
104

Jd. at 2589.

:
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the partnership" requirement. 105 Therefore, Pratt may be pointed
to as authority for the proposition that general partners in a limited partnership cannot claim guaranteed payments for performing
their essential duties under the partnership agreement; that, in

they are merely attempting to generate deductions by altering the form of distribution of their partnership income.
Pratt also involved guaranteed payments for the use of capital. The taxpayers had loaned funds to both partnerships and had
received in return notes, secured by deeds of trust, wherein the
partnerships agreed to repay principal plus interest at the rate of
seven percent per annum without regard to partnership receipts
or income. In the years in question, the partnerships did not pay
the interest but credited it to the accounts payable to the taxpayers, who did not include the amounts as interest income in those
years. As with the credits for management fees, the parties intended the interest payments to be made and the taxpayers had
the right to cause payment. The Service, however, did not dispute
that the interest payments were guaranteed payments. Rather,
it sought to hold the taxpayers to the Regulation that recipients
must report the guaranteed payments in the year when accrued
by the partnership, whether the payments are actually made or
106
not.
The taxpayers argued that the application of such a Regulation to cash-basis partners was an "overextension" of the Commissioner's authority, but the court applied the Regulation.
Although the guaranteed payment treatment for use of capital was not directly threatened by the Pratt decision, this victory
by the Service in the area of guaranteed payments for services
may lead to a more direct assault on guaranteed payments for
capital. Many partnership agreements contain elaborate provisions
for various types of loans from partners to the partnership. Many
of these provisions are simply attempts to generate guaranteed
payment deductions for "interest" payments to partners which
would otherwise be received by them in the form of distributive
shares of partnership income. The underlying "loans" may be vulnerable to the challenge that they are, in economic reality, contributions to capital rather than loans to the partnership. 107 Therereality,

W5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.707-1 (a) (1958)
(a) Partner not acting in capacity as partner. A partner who
engages in a transaction with a partnership other than in his capacity as a partner shall be treated as if he were not a member of
the partnership with respect to such transaction. Such transactions
include, for example, loans of money ... by the partner to the
partnership
.
and the rendering of services ... by the partner
.
.

to the partnership.
106
'

5ee id. § 1.707-1 (c).
See Joseph W. Hambuechen, 43 T.C. 90, 100-01 (1964).

07
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no guaranteed payment for "interest" could be claimed by

fore,

the partnership.
One final point should be made regarding guaranteed payments. In Cagle the deduction from the guaranteed payment was
allocated to the two investor-partners. This is what is commonly
done when there is a promoter-partner who has surplus losses
from other sources. He can absorb the taxable income that must
be reported by the recipient of a guaranteed payment and will allocate his share of the corresponding partnership deduction to his
investor-partners in need of tax shelter. However, guaranteed payments are often made to a partner who does not want to absorb
taxable income. There are situations in which such a partner is
specially allocated the entire corresponding partnership deduction
08
There
so he will not have to pay tax on the guaranteed payment.'
is no authority precisely on point, but it would appear that such
an allocation violates the "principal purpose" limitation 109 because
it allocates the deduction away from those who bear the economic
burden of the expense.

B.

A

common

Receipt of a Profits Interest

practice in the real estate area is for lawyers, ac-

countants, architects, and other professionals to take a "piece of
the action" in the form of a profits interest in lieu of or in addition
to immediate cash payment for services rendered. The popularity
of the practice was explained in large part by the assumption that
the receipt of a profits interest in a partnership is not a taxable
event. Section 721 provides that no gain or loss will be recognized to a partnership or its partners on "a contribution of property to the partnership in exchange for an interest in the partnership."" However, the Regulations under section 721 also mention
the receipt of a partnership interest in exchange for services
]06

See Cowan, Receipt of a Partnership Interest for Services, 1974-2
N.Y.U. 32d Inst, on Fed. Tax. 1501, 1521-22. See also Boffa, Tax Problems
in Compensating the Joint Venture Partner, 1 J. Real Estate Taxation 131,
142 (1974), in which the author suggests that promoter-partners who must
include in income the value of profits interests received in exchange for
services be specially allocated the corresponding deduction to which the
partnership
yo9

is entitled.

§ 1.721-1 (b) (2) (1956). When a partner receives
an interest in a partnership in exchange for services rendered to a partner,
"it is not deductible by the partnership, but is deductible only by such partner
to the extent allowable under this chapter." Id. If it is for services rendered
to the partnership, "it is a guaranteed payment for services under section

Compare Treas. Reg.

707(c)." Id.

U0Id.

§ 1.721-1 (a) states that section 721 "shall not apply to a transaction
between a partnership and a partner not acting in his capacity as a partner
since such a transaction is governed by section 707."
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Normally, under local law, each partner is entitled to be
repaid his contributions of money or other property to
the partnership (at the value placed upon such property
by the partnership at the time of the contribution) ....
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of
his right to be repaid his contributions (as distinguished
from a share in partnership profits) in favor of another
section 721
partner as compensation for services,
does not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership capital so transferred to a partner as compensation
for services constitutes income to the partner under sec.

tion 61.

.

.

in

This language was widely interpreted to mean that the receipt of
an interest in partnership capital" 7 in exchange for services was
a taxable event, but the receipt of an interest in the partnership
profits in exchange for services was not a taxable event. The latter
proposition has been defended on the basis of the parenthetical in
the above-quoted Regulation that excepts he receipt of a profits
interest from the declaration of the taxability of a receipt of a
capital interest. Under the "no taxable event" interpretation, the
recipient obtains a zero basis in his partnership interest, 3 must
subsequently report as ordinary income his allocable share of the
partnership profits, and pays capital gain on the sale of the
1

'

interest.

To the

disbelief of

many, the Tax Court in Sol Diamond" 4

rejected the contention that section 721 requires nonrecognition
of a receipt of an interest in partnership profits in exchange for
services. Diamond was a mortgage broker who obtained numerous
loans for experienced builders from a savings and loan association.
Diamond received commissions from the borrowers, several of

n

'/d.

112

§1.721-1 (b)(1).

The

interest in partnership "capital" described in the Regulations is
the right to be repaid contributions to capital. Many assume that this is adjusted by shares of profits and losses of the partnership. See, e.g., Cowan,

supra note 108, at 1513-14, wherein the author states:
The litmus test of an interest in capital at any moment of time
within the meaning of Section 721 can be phrased as follows: Convert all of the partnership assets into cash at then fair market values,
pay off all liabilities, and distribute the balance. The amount that
each partner would receive is his interest in capital. A partner's
capital account, then, is the value of his equitable interest in the net

A

profits interest, on the other hand, is a
right to share in future changes of net worth, either by way of outside
income or by way of changes in the values of partnership assets.
113
The zero basis would be increased to the extent he shares in partner-

assets of the partnership.

ship liabilities.

n4 56 T.C. 530 (1971), affd 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974).

INDIANA

934

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:899

with certain officers of the savings and loan association. Diamond received the interest in question from a Mr. Kargman, an experienced syndicator, as compensation for obtaining
one hundred percent financing of the purchase price of an office
building. It was agreed that Kargman would pay all acquisition
costs above the amount of financing, and that Kargman and Diamond would share profits in a 40-60 ratio, respectively, and would
be "chargeable with all losses in the same proportions." 115 Net proceeds of any subsequent sale of the building were to be divided in
the same ratio, after first being applied to reimburse Kargman
for any acquisition expenditures he incurred. Diamond was not
obligated to contribute any acquisition costs nor was he obligated
to provide further services. Three weeks after closing the purchase
of the building, Diamond sold his interest for $40,000 and subsequently reported that amount as a short-term capital gain from
116
the sale of a partnership interest.
The Tax Court could not resist denying Diamond capital gains
treatment for the receipt of $40,000 for services performed just a
few weeks earlier. It concluded that a contribution of services was
not a contribution of "property" within the nonrecognition provisions of section 721. As to the parenthetical in the section 721
Regulations, which according to popular belief mandated nonrecognition of the receipt of a "profits" interest for services, the court
said its effect is "obscure." The court concluded that the "opaque
draftmanship" in the Regulations was insufficient to override the
general rule that the fair market value of property received for
117
services must be included in gross income.
In so doing, the court
the
difficult question of whether the interest indid not discuss

which he

split

volved was an interest in "capital" or "profits" and substantially
lessened the importance of the distinction by its summary dismissal of the section 721 Regulations." 8
,,5

56 T.C. at 537.

116

In the case of a sale or exchange of an interest in a partnership
loss shall be considered as gain or loss from the sale or
exchange of a capital asset, except as otherwise provided in section
751 (relating to unrealized receivables and inventory items which have
appreciated substantially in value).
Code §741.
n7 C0DE 61(a) Treas. Reg.
1.61-2(d)

... gain or

§

118

;

§

The Tax Court did leave open the

(1)

(1966).

possibility of future application of

the parenthetical:

Regardless of whether there may be some kind of equitable justification for giving the parenthetical clause some limited form of affirmative operative scope, as perhaps

where there is a readjustment of
partners' shares to reflect services being performed by one of the
partners, we cannot believe that the regulations were ever intended to
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An

important question not directly presented by the facts nor
discussed in the Tax Court's opinion is whether a service partner
who reports as ordinary income the value of the partnership interest when received must again pay ordinary income tax on his distributive shares of partnership profits as they are earned. For
example, if a partner must include in ordinary income the fair market value of the right to receive $1,000 a year for several years in
the future, will he again be taxed at ordinary income rates on the
$1,000 payments as they are actually received? Or can the basis
obtained in his interest by paying tax on its fair market value be
amortized as the profits are earned? In affirming the Tax Court,
the Seventh Circuit addressed the objection that there will be
double taxation if the right to share in future profits and the
subsequent receipts of those profits are both taxed. The court said
that the "absence of a recognized procedure for amortization
[did not] militate against the treatment of the creation of the
n9
profit share as income."
However, the court found a need
for "the promulgation of appropriate regulations to achieve a degree of certainty" in this matter. 120
Vestal v. United States™^ throws substantial doubt on the extent to which a taxpayer may report a low market value in the year
of receipt based on the contingent nature of future profits and subsequently report any gain on disposition as appreciation in value
of a capital asset. Vestal knew assignees of an oil and gas lease who
were attempting to sell limited partnership interests to raise money
to drill additional wells required of them by the lease assignment.
In 1962, he contacted four investors who supplied the remaining
needed funds, became limited partners, and agreed to pay him a
finder's fee. Each agreed in writing to convey to Vestal one-eighth
of his limited partnership interest upon recovery of his investment
in the partnership, plus six percent interest compounded semiannually. Two years later, the general partners sold the partnership's assets, and the purchase price was paid in three yearly installments. The four investors, after receiving their share of the purchase price and deducting the amount of their investment plus
interest, issued checks to Vestal totaling $139,730 for one-eighth
of the remaining balance.
bring section 721 into play in a situation like the one before us.
56 T.G. at 546.

'"Diamond

v.

Commissioner, 492 F.2d 286, 290-91 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'g

56 T.C. 530 (1971).
120

Peter P. Risko, 26 T.C. 485 (1956), has been cited as authority for the
proposition that the amount included in income may be amortized when the
partnership has a determinable
,2,

life.

498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir. 1974), rev'g 73-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1J9260 (W.D.

Ark. 1973).

INDIANA

936

LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 8:899

The district court had concluded that the compensation agreements gave Vestal an interest in a capital asset which had a fair
market value of $29,375 when executed in 1962 and should have
been reported in that year. Vestal had not reported the value of
the interests in 1962, and the statute of limitations had run against
the government for that year. The court directed that the gains
from the 1964 disposition be taxed at long-term capital gains rates,
using the $29,375 value which should have been reported in 1962
as the basis in computing the gain.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, accepting the
Government's position that the interests obtained by Vestal in
1962 "were contingent, conditional, and speculative, and as a matter of law, did not constitute income taxable to Vestal in 1962." 122
The court admitted that Vestal's rights had value in 1962, but
said that "such recognition does not support a view that Vestal
received income under the federal tax laws." Clearly the court
did not want to encourage taxpayers to undervalue contingent interests received for services and subsequently claim capital gains
treatment on disposition. 123

Diamond was not

cited to the Vestal court until Vestal's peti-

which he raised

as authority for the proposition that the value of his interest was income in 1962. The court

tion for rehearing, in

it

denied the petition and said that the effect of its decision was to
tax Vestal upon his acquisition of "the actual joint venture interests" and was consistent with the decision in Diamond that the
taxable event was "when the parties actually acquired the building
24
to be held as a joint venture."'
However facile the court's reconciliation of the two cases, they both clearly indicate strong opposition to capital gains treatment of compensation for services. In
Diamond, both the Tax Court 125 and the Seventh Circuit suggested
"the possibility that Diamond would not in any event be entitled to
'

22

498F.2d at 490.

123

Undervaluation would allow compensatory income taxable at ordinary
rates to be treated as capital appreciation upon taxpayer's actually receiving the performance promised him by the contract. When dealing with a situation such as the present where taxpayer holds an
executory contingent contract payable in the future, the tax laws
should not be construed so stringently, on the one hand, so as to
require a taxpayer to pay an income tax on its estimated value; nor
should they be construed so loosely, on the other, as to permit him
to establish a basis for those same contract rights in the absence
of a showing that there was an actual trading or marketing of those
rights.
Id. at 493-94 (citation omitted).
124

/<£ at

,25

496 (order on petition for rehearing).

56 T.C. at 547, n.16.
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126

Service partners may find some relief from Diamond and
Vestal under section 83, added by the Tax Reform Act of 1969.
Section 83, although debated and passed in the context of corporate
executive compensation, can readily be interpreted to apply to partnership transactions as well. Indeed, the Proposed Regulations
under section 721 indicate that section 83 will be applied to part127
Section 83 provides that the fair market
nership transactions.
value of property transferred in connection with services is taxable at ordinary income rates at the time of receipt if the property
is either transferable or not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture. If the interest is nontransferable and forfeitable when received, it is taxable when it first becomes either transferable or
128
However, even if the interest is forfeitable and
nonforfeitable.
not transferable, the recipient may elect to pay ordinary income
129
tax on the value of the interest in the year in which it is received.
The advantage of this election is that subsequent increases in value
prior to the lapse of the restrictions will be taxed only as a capital
130
gain upon disposition of the property.

126

492 F.2d at 287.

,27

Proposed Treas. Reg.

§ 1.721-l(b) (1) (i), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,799 (1971).
If the partnership interest is transferred after June 30, 1969 (ex-

cept to the extent paragraph (b) of § 1.83-8 applies) , then the transfer
of such interest in partnership capital shall be treated as a transfer
of property to which section 83 and the regulations thereunder applies.
The Proposed Regulations restate the parenthetical in the present section
721 Regulations that was at issue in Diamond. See notes 114-18 supra. Because
Diamond ignored the parenthetical and the distinction between capital and
profits for the purposes of section 721, it would seem that the Proposed
Regulations, published prior to Diamond, cause all receipts of partnership
interests for services to be governed by section 83.
128

Code§ 83(a).

129

Code

§ 83(b).

130

If this election is made, section 83(a) and the regulations thereunder,
do not apply with respect to such property, and except as otherwise

provided in section 83(d)(2) and the regulations thereunder, any
subsequent appreciation in the value of the property is not taxable as
compensation. In computing the gain or loss from the subsequent sale
or exchange of such property,
the property increased by the

its

basis shall be the

amount included

amount paid for

in gross income

under

section 83(b).

Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.83-2 (a), 36 Fed. Reg. 10,789-90 (1971) (emphasis
added) However, if such election is made and "such property is subsequently
.

no deduction shall be allowed in respect of such forfeiture." Code
For further discussion of the applicability of section 83 to receipts
of partnership interests, see Cowan, supra note 108, at 1527-40.

forfeited,
§ 83(b).
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Preadmission Losses

In a sense, the ultimate rub of the present-day realty tax shelter is the fairly common practice of admitting shelter-hungry investors to partnerships at the end of the year and giving them an
allocation of losses as if they had been partners for the entire year.
Many defend the practice and, at the same time, advise their clients
to refrain from flaunting its existence. For example, some practitioners will counsel their clients to avoid written predictions of
preadmission losses to year-end admittees. The two basic arguments made in defense of the practice are that (1) it is a legitimate exercise of the flexibility offered by section 704 (a) to determine partnership allocations in the partnership agreement and
(2) it is specifically authorized by the rule of section 761 (c) that
amendments to partnership agreements relate back to the beginning of the taxable year. 131
The first argument is that retroactive allocations of losses, if
they are subject to scrutiny at all, are special allocations which
will be disregarded only if they violate the "principal purpose"
limitation of section 704(b) (2). At first, it might seem peculiar
to defend a practice by asserting that it is subject to such a broadlystated limitation. Nevertheless, this is an understandable position
for advocates of retroactive loss allocations. It concedes nothing,
because no one has ever suggested that retroactive allocations are
exempt from the principal purpose limitation. More importantly,
uncertainties about the application of the principal purpose limitation have delayed its development as an effective rationale against
partnership tax avoidance schemes. It is fairly easy to provide at
least a paper correlation between the retroactivity of the loss allocation and some economic incident of the partnership and claim that
is sufficient under the sparse law on point. In short, the argument
is an attempt to create a safe harbor within the virtually nonexistent limitations of section 704(b) (2).
The argument based on section 761 (c) finds some support in
2
the recent case of Norman Rodman,™ in which the Tax Court required a late-admitted partner to report his share of partnership
gain on the basis of the full taxable year. The joint venture in
Rodman was formed in 1955 with four equal participants. On No'

'

rji

Far purposes of this subchapter, a partnership agreement includes any
modifications of the partnership agreement made prior to, or at, the
time prescribed by law for the filing of the partnership return for the
taxable year (not including extensions) which are agreed to by all the
partners or which are adopted in such other manner as may be
provided by the partnership agreement.
Code § 761(c).
,32
32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1307 (1973).
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1956, one of the participants withdrew by selling his
entire interest to the remaining participants. Three days later, the
2,

son of one of the remaining participants was admitted as a twentytwo percent participant. A deficiency was assessed at the venture
level for 1956, and the question was whether the Service could
hold the son liable for the deficiency as if he had participated for
the entire year.
The son argued that his share of profits and losses was intended to begin with his admission to the venture. The Servcie alleged and proved that the intent had been to retroactively amend
the joint venture agreement so that the son would share in the entire year's profits and losses. Indeed, on the venturer's 1956 partnership return, the son had been allocated twenty-two percent of
the partnership losses for the entire year, and he had filed his individual return on the same basis. The Service merely wanted to
hold him responsible for the same period for what it determined to
be a gain rather than a loss, and the court held it could.

The commentators generally agree that Rodman

is

weak auth-

ority for retroactive allocations of preadmission losses.

133

First,

the court clearly stated that proration of income or loss was required with respect to the partner who withdrew. Second, the
court did not satisfactorily discuss the issue of retroactivity, and
134
its precise reasoning is unclear.
Although the interests of the
three remaining partners were reduced upon the son's admission,
the court did not mention section 706(c) (2) (B), which would appear to require proration. Third, the extent to which retroactivity
was actually involved is unclear, because the government concluded
that Rodman "was active in the joint venture prior to the time he
was allegedly brought into the venture." 135 Fourth, the government, not the taxpayer, attempted to establish retroactivity of
taxable income, not tax losses. The court may have felt that because the son had claimed losses for the entire year, it was not
unfair to hold him to his claim to the entire year when the losses
were determined to be gains. Finally, the holding is questionable
insofar as the son bore a share of the tax burden greater than his
share of economic benefits.
In short, despite Rodman, there remains a clear possibility
that either one of two provisions may be applied to deprive year-

—

33
Cowan, Allocating the Tax Shelter Retroactively: The Rodman Case,
Real Estate Taxation 5 (1974) Koff & Hammer, Retroactive Allocations: The Case Against Rodman, id. at 18; McGuire, Retroactive Allocations
Among Partners: The Rodman Decision, 52 Taxes 325 (1974) Weidner, Year'

2 J.

;

;

end Sales of Losses in Real Estate Partnerships, 1974 U. III. L.F. 533.
,34
In fairness to the court, it should be pointed out that the court and
subsequent commentators have noted that the case was poorly litigated.
,3S
McGuire, supra note 133, at 325 n.3.
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end admittees the benefit of retroactive allocations of preadmission losses. First, section 708 provides that a partnership is terminated for tax purposes if there is a "sale or exchange" of fifty
percent or more of the total interest in partnership capital and
profits. This provision clearly separates termination of a partnership for federal income tax purposes from dissolution under local
136
If the admission of new partners constitutes such a "sale
law.
or exchange," the newly admitted partners will be members of a
new partnership, rather than the one that incurred the losses. Even
if there is no termination under section 708, proration may be required. Section 706(c) (2) (B) provides that the taxable year of
the partnership shall not close with respect to a partner who sells
or exchanges less than his entire interest in the partnership,
or with respect to a partner whose interest is reduced,
but such partner's distributive share of items described in
section 702(a) shall be determined

by taking

into account

his varying interests in the partnership during the taxable

year.

137

can be argued that the interests of initial partners are
"reduced" when newly admitted partners are passed shares in net
cash flow, proceeds of refinancing or sale, etc., such that year-end
admittees may only share in the partnership losses for the period
of the year during which they were members. The general policy
against trafficking in tax losses would support the conclusion that
these two proration requirements apply to year-end admittees and
are not superseded by the more general provisions of sections
704(a) and 761(c). 138
In short,

it

IX.

Conclusion

In the early part of the nineteenth century, limited partnership statutes were enacted to give profit-sharing passive investors
a corporate-type freedom from enterprise liability prior to the
general availability of the corporate form. The Code has no separate classification for limited partnerships, which will be governed by the partnership provisions of Subchapter
unless they
are classified as corporations for tax purposes. The present classification Regulations are remnants of the attempt to deny corporate
classification to professional associations and are heavily biased

K

,36

See Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1 (c) (1) (1956).

137

Code

'

36

§

706(c)(2)(B)

The refinement

(emphasis added).

of the rules concerning retroactive allocation is pres-

ently under the consideration of the

House Ways and Means Committee.
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toward classifying as a partnership for tax purposes anything that
is a partnership, general or limited, under local law.
The Service, however, has issued a series of Revenue Procedures that indicate that partnership classification may be withheld
from limited partnerships that do not have general partners with
substantial assets, that employ allocation systems that do not accord all partners significant shares in all items of income and loss,
and that utilize deduction-generating and accelerating devices to
such an extent as to suggest that the partnership is primarily for
the purpose of generating and distributing tax losses rather than
for economic profit. The basic reason for going beyond the Regulations is the tremendous popularity of limited partnerships to
deliver tax losses to high-bracket limited partners who have all
the limited liability of the corporate form and who nevertheless
claim the pass-through of losses available to partnerships. Furthermore, limited partners deduct tax losses far in excess of their
economic investment because of a Regulation stating that limited
partners may claim partnership losses beyond cash investment to
the further extent they share in partnership liabilities that are
fully non-recourse. The Treasury has considered withdrawing this
Regulation, but has not yet done so. The idea will continue to have
appeal until some sort of reform is enacted, or until the popularity
of the limited partnership somehow wanes. In the meantime, the
Service can be expected to become more strict in its requirements
that something approaching significant personal liability be present, on the use of certain devices to generate and accelerate losses,
such as guaranteed payments and prepayments of interest, on allocation systems designed to distribute tax benefits independent of
economic benefits, and on retroactive allocations of preadmission
losses.

